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Jacques Delaruelle
The following remarks are made in the wake of a paper on the same topic read
at the 1992 Art Association of Australia conference in Canberra. On that
occasion I tried to demonstrate the continuing relevance ofaesthetics in a field
ofactivity whose custodians seem to view this subject as a thing of the past, an
ideological relic privileging such dubious notions as taste, the primacy of the
visual in the visual arts or the unity of the subject and the presumed universal ity
of its judgement. Mostly I sought to do away with the notion that aesthetics is
primarily a negation of art history and dared to mention the failure, still too
common amongst art historians, to acknowledge that art (or literature) can only
become concrete historical processes through the experience of those who
welcome the a:uvres, enjoy them, judge them and, later, remember or forget
them. I also endeavoured to demonstrate the falseness of the a<;sumption that
aestheticians implicitly defend a conception of art-history as the history of a
perpetual present-supposedly that of the aesthetic experience-and showed
that the aesthetics of Reception is on the contrary precisely concerned with the
historical function of the viewers who actualise the works in responding
imaginatively to them. For c1carly the phenomenon of reception docs not
amount to a discontinuous series of subjective impressions but is, on the
contrary, a guided perception, one that takes place in relation to previous
similar experiences. As Starobinsky puts it: 'the relation of a singular text to
the constellation of iL" antecedents constituting the genre to which the text
belongs, depends on an ongoing shifting of horizons. The new text evokes an
horizon of expectations and rules with which the reader (viewer) is familiar,
but this horizon has been continuously modified and corrected by the viewer's
aesthetic perception'.' Similarly Hans Robert Jauss, whilst considering the
beholder's activity simultaneously critical and creative, makes it clear that
when they 'interpret' a work of art, viewers do create new conditions that
determ ine the advent ofother works. Finally with reference to the work of Hans
Robert Jauss, I concluded my paper with the hope that art historians and
aestheticians would at some point rcalise the necessity of working together.
But for a number of reasons, this docs not seem to be happening and in the
six or seven art institutions whose syllabus I am aware of, aesthetics simply
docs not have a place and is not considered a teachable subject. Perhaps in the
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traditional context of art education which was a technical affair for the most
part, this might have made sense. As a branch of philosophy, aesthetics exists,
after all, for the sake of knowledge and not as a guide to practice. But in the
broader and supposedly liberal context of today's art-education, this is an
absurd situation. Though I was for a time allowed 10 develop and teach a
comprehensive introduction 10 the discipline for undergraduate studenlc; at the
Collegc of Fine Arts of the University of New South Wales and also to devise
several postgraduate seminars on aesthetic themes, the discussion ofPlalO's,
Aristotle's, Aquinas', Kant's, Schelling's, Hegel's, Nietzschc'sand Heidcgger's
contribution to the understanding of art seems, on the wholc, barely acceptable
as 'cultural literacy' . Yet this prohibition is not primarily 10 do with thcalleged
impertinencc of the aesthctic theorist invading the artist's domain with an
apparatus of critical principles and theoretical precepts. It coincides with
dogmatic post-structuralist a<;sumptions concerning individual self-conscious-
ness and the hasty demise of the willed subject. Moreover the evaporation of
aesthetics is not in the least surprising in a context of disappearing 'great
narratives' where the first thing a studentleams is that the text has no referent
outside itself, or that interpretation has no bearing upon fact as distinguishable
from interprewtion.
Retrospectively Ithink that my tenuous licence to teach aesthetics in an art
college was linked with a general uncertainty as to what should be taught in a
situation where 'no one can say with assurance what a work of art is, or what
is nota work ofart' ,2 and probably with the even greater uncertainty as 10 what
philosophical aesthetics might well be. But once it becomes clear that it is at
lcast partly to do with the question of valuc, and more specifically the value of
certain visual or acoustic experiences, oncc it is understood that aesthetics on
the whole docs not relegate subjectivity to being simply a function of some-
thing else, there can no longer be any doubt as to the ideological badness and
the necd to dispense altogether with the subject. In fact it docs at times secm
that the history of Modernist art (I was tempted to say its conquests) had
effectively frecd all those who believc in this grand narrative from the
obligation of answering the perenn ial and as yet unanswered questions of the
cognitive value of appearances, the enigma of the truth of art, the aesthetic
experience and other such aporias.
It is, of course, not only the history of aesthetics-{)r the history of
subjectivity-which is either ignored or suppressed in thc syllabuses of
department of arttheory/history of art colleges, ac; well of those of fine arts in
universities. But like 'pre-modernist' literature or art history, aesthetics as a
subject clearly docs not fit the official picture of an interminable ballle fought
against the hydra of religious dogma, identity, local traditions, colonialism,
Eurocentrism. phallocentrism,logocentrism, not to mention phallogocentrism
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'" Less superficially, the reason(s) at the origin of the defacto suppression of
aesthetics in art education can perhaps best be glimpsed through the history of
its paradigms, as it is told by Marc Sherringharn in his recent work.) According
to this author, three constitutive moments can be distinguished: the classical,
the critical and the romantic.
Classical aesthetics depends on the identification of the beautiful with
Being captured in its essence by works of art or natural objects. If such an
essence is made responsive to theoretical intuition by the work ofart, it is only
insofar ali the lallerduplicates the inner structure ofan ideal reality. In the sense
that classicism always tends to prefer the madelto its copy, artistic beauty is
by definition inferior to the beauty of Being.
With Kant's Third Critique is established the second paradigm according
to which the subject replaces Being as the principal source of the beautiful
which becomes, as it were, established at the heart of the subject. The
experience of the beautiful is a pure feeling of disinterested pleasure, or
disinterested interest. It is but an occasion for the subject to eltperience the
inner finality of its faculties. In other words art is a place where the conciliation
betwecn the autonomous Spirit and Nature can take place. But there cannot be
a unique place that would be that of the beautiful in the philosophical territory.
The beautiful is everywhere one is able see the good and the true. In iL<; essence
the c1a<;sical definition of the beautiful remains separate from art which
consequently has to remain an Imitation of Nature. But, according to Kant, the
beautiful stands very precisely between Nature and Freedom, and its definition
concerns both nature and art. In any case ifthecIassical ideal ofbeauty involves
Being as such, iL<; critical definition mostly concerns the transcendental
subject. Beauty cea<;es to be an ontological attribute to become a subjective
fecling, based on the strictly human faculty of taste.
The third possibility of location for the Beautiful coincides with the
identification of the beautiful with art itself and therefore, with Hegel'sputsch
in the first pages of his Aesthetics from which is excluded the beauty of nature.
'For our science is Philosophy ofArt', Hegel declares, 'and morc definitely
Philosophy ofFine Arts' .·Only a work ofart can be said to be beautiful because
the essence of beauty is spiritual and the Spirit, which is both freedom and
subjectivity, goes welI beyond the inert objectivity of nature. So living nature
which Aristotle thought divine comes to be dismissed in the name of what Marc
Sherringham terms 'the spiritual deficiency of the animal realm' and to the
whole object of Kant's Critique of Teleological Judgement is denied theoreti-
cal legitimacy. Only art can now reveal or 'unconceal', as Heidegger was to
write, the essence of the truth of being as Spirit. In opposition to both classical
aesthetics and the critical paradigm, Hegel describes art as the most congruous
and therefore highest expression of the beautiful.
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There can be no doubt that the frequency with which the Hegelian
assimilation of art with the Absolute recurs in the recent history of Ideas is
indicative of its dominance as a theory in contemporary art practices. Yet
Hegel saw music-like other art forms-as only part of the prelude to the fully
transparent and articulated concept of philosophy, or only as a stage in the
realisation of the Absolute. On the contrary, Nietzsche believed that the
concept ofart had come to supplant the concept ofphilosophy. In other words,
the author of Zarathustra believed that the transformation of philosophy
demanded the intervention of art. Likewise Heidegger did not at all renounce
Nietzsche's notion of 'great art' . He thoughtthalart never merely expresses the
essence of a historical period, but constitutes its origin:
Art let truth originate. Art, founding. preserving. is the spring that leaps to the
truth of beings in the work. To originate something by a leap. to bring
something into being hom out of its essential source in a founding leap-this
is what the word 'origin' means.)
In Heidegger's description of the work as a 'leap to the truth ofbeing',that is
as a 'happening of truth " it is suggested that the revelation of a historical UlJth
coincides with the epiphany of art. And the point here is that, as philosophical
romanticism from Hegel onwards turns the beauty of art a<; an expression of
'truth selling itsclfto work', it articulates the essential opposition in the history
of the discipline as one between the romantic paradigm -'truth needs art to
come to being' and the classical paradigm which is so often mistaken for it, but
which inversely states that art needs truth for its coming into being. In the
process, Criticism, or Kant's hypothesis concerning the transcendental sub-
jcct, is wh isked away and, with it 'aesthetics' understood notas the 'phi losophy
of art', let alone the 'art of philosophy', but as the philosophy of taste and
sensus communis.
Thiscrudelyexpressed hypothesis docs not entirely explain the domination
of the two mutually exclusive, but also complementary, paradigms, or the de
facto suppression of the Kantian model from the discussion about the nature
of 'modernity' and 'the end of art'. But a picture begins to form as one
remembers that the superiority ofartistic beauty coincided, for Hegel, with the
fact that it must be born out of the mind and literally realised by it. Inasmuch
as Spirit and Freedom can be found even in the tritest of 'artistic thoughts' ,the
signi ficance ofartistic beauty has to eclipse that ofall natural productions. The
problem with this view. however, is that if 'the beauty ofart' were nothing but
'a sensuous presentation of the idea', art (artistic beauty) would be superior to
nature, since more appropriate to its finality, but it would also be hopelessly
inferior to science and philosophy. And this, I think, is why Kant insists on the
primacy of the differential clement-irreducible to the legislative power of the
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mind-in the aesthetic experience and describes 'the aesthetic idea (as) an
inexponible representation of the imagination (in its free play)'.6 As shown by
Luc Ferry in his Homo Aestheticus , Kant wished to avoid the reduction of art
into a kind of inferior knowledge, a gnoseolia inferior.7
Morcover, with or without Kant in mind, it is impossible not to observe that
whenever 'art' tries to communicate a clear and distinct thought, it tends to do
so in the least appropriate ofmanners and becomes iIIustrative of ideas, in other
words merely pmctical or instrumental. As an experience or as a realisation,
Kant thought that beauty could never be based on 'determinate concepts'. As
a given sight triggers the agreement between the faculties, the fec\ing of
harmony experienced by the subject must thcrefore come from Nature herself.
This means that the free play of the beholder's imagination can not be
artificially induced. Were it not spontancous, such a response would lose its
power, its charm would no longer operate. For what intelligence 'enjoys'
whilst contemplating a beautiful sight is precisely a 'worldliness' that allows
for the most delightful con-fusion. And in the end the very possibility of
aesthetic contemplation comes to depend on the reality of this con-fusion and
co-presence between subject and world.
Numerous philosophers-from Spinoza to Merleau Ponty-have in lhe
past celebmted this alliance and affirmed the reality of innate certainties, of
virtual convictions that rely neither on experience, nor on other forms of a
posteriori knowledge. Merleau Ponty notably considered the capacity of
distinguishing the whole in the parLs as pointing to lhe existence of a
foreknowledge of the ontological realm that prepares us to encounter the
object. Since man does not have a separate existence from the world he
contemplates-such a separateness being inferred by the CogilO-his thought
never proceeds ex nihilo, nor as a pure affirmation of some intellectual
sovereignty, but as an expression ofaccord or discord wilh lhe world. Similarly
the feeling of pleasure which echoes the realisation of a work ofart's specific
intelligibility is 'determined by aground which is apriori and valid for all men
... merely by virtue of the reference of the object to the faculty of cognition'.
This common ground, Kantexplains, is the capacity forpleasureordisplea<;ure
connected with lhe subjective side of a representation, or in response to the
outward form of the object.
The universality formerly ascribed to the aesthetic judgement coincided
with the philosopher's elaboration of the concept of apriori in lhe foundation
of his transcendental system, or to put it in the vernacular, with a certain accord
betwecn man and world ... not limited to the phenomenon of knowledge.' This
accord was not primarily a question of identity or of 'representations referred
to an object according to certain principles'. Il was based on indemonstrable
aesthetic ideas or 'intuitions (of the imagination) for which no adequate
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concept can ever be found'.9 Again, it is important to realise that the description
of art as a primarily aesthetic activity-i.e., concerned with the production of
non-conceptual truth-docs not necessarily imply a purely appreciative (pas-
sive) view, and that such an understanding depends upon the postulate of
reflective judgement that there is a system inherent in what the theoristcan only
investigate in a piecemeal way. For Kant. the postulates of reflective judge-
ment were founded upon seeing nature as art,IO but immediately after Kant
natural beauty was dropped from the agenda of aesthetics or more exactly
repressed as Adorno puts itll and aesthetics altogether 'shifted towards the
ideological religion of art' which in degraded forms is still with us today.
To illustrate this last proposition,let me briefly mention Thierry de Duve's
polemic essayl2 on modem art before and after Duchamp, whose less-than-
novel thesis is that the truth of modem art is precisely that it has no truth. To
justify this, the author begins with the contention that it has become sufficient
to replace the formula of the aesthetic judgement 'this is beautiful' with the
formula 'this is An'. And here once again, we go back to the romantic
localisation of 'the beautiful' in art. But more mdically, de Duve in his book
seeks to explain art as a proper name: 'modernity', he writes, 'is that moment
in western history during which art is buta propername, this moment being one
during which aesthetic practice-that of the artist, the amateur or the critic-
is regulated by the idea ofart as proper name'. Please note that the proper name
here is understood as a term whose purpose is not to signify a meaning, but to
label or designate, rather, a fixed system of references. Fundamentally, Duve's
theory implies that 'art is all that which I name an' and this, of course, entails
the complete uselessness of any allemptto define its meaning as idea.
Were we to get back to the Kantian terminology, it could perhaps be argued
that the judgement 'this is art' is a reflective judgement whose postulates are
founded upon seeing anything as art. Yetonlythe particular is given. No longer
is there any concept ofart under which any subsumption can be effected. There
is only the play of the facuILies of the mind around unfathomable referents and
art once again becomes an instance of a universal rule that is nowhere to be
fathomed, let alone identified. It has been argued that such a theory has the
merit of showing that the romantic tradition stands 'guiILy of a very specific
form of transcendental illusion: that of believing in art as a rational idea that
one can know and re-present'.13 In any case its main proposition is that at the
origin of modernity in art lies a productive misunderstanding, a confusion
between Criticism which initiates the practice of art as play or as difference,
and the romantic determ ination to establish the meaning ofGreat An. Accord-
ing to de Duve, the Duchampian Ready Made unconceals the equivalence of
the proper name and the 'anything goes' thus forcing the romantic discourse
apropos the meaning of art to confess, as it were its 'nothing to say'.
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Consequently the nonnative idea ofart as propernarne becomes the categorical
imperative of today's self-conscious artists. They have to do anything. in the
sense that only 'anything' as opposed to 'something' can be said to be art
Hcnce also the paradoxical obligation now implemcnted in virtually all art
col1cgcs and universities. Therc it is possiblc to witncss thc ritualistic serious-
ness of a teaching without content other than 'anything goes' under the name
of art.
I could give numerous examples of this disastrous trend. But let me just
provide one: a new postgraduatc subject introduced in the syllabus of the art
theory department of the Collegc of Fine Arts at the University of NSW.
dealing with 'an and the culture of everyday lifc·. Now thc 'spirit' of this
subject was-the lecturer dixil-cncapsulatcd in the fol1owing briefstatement
of the Dutch artist Joehin GerL: 'what I'm doing is not important because it is
art or literature. it's important because I'm doing it. The prerequisite for what
I am doing is not art, it is lifc'. But ifit isonly important because 'itis lifc·. why
makc art? The samc connection between art and everyday life was also
recognised by Ellc McPherson who, in the course of an intervicw with thc
Sydney Morning Herald, stated that 'thc only books shc would cver read would
be the books that she herself would have wriuen'. What matters here is that the
fashion model was not only speaking for herself but was making explicit the
position of the many who, like herself. believe 'art' to be important only
because they themselves are doing 'it'.
To conclude, let me just point out the irony inherent in the situation wherc
Kant's axiomatic notion of rcnectivc judgcmcnt is simultancously suppressed
as a scholarly reference and resurfaces as one of the most important principles
of the contemporary doxn. Indeed Marx's well-known warning that those who
ignore history are by definition condemned to repeat it finds a near perfect
illustration in the field of artthcory and art education. Therc one can sec the
most radical theorics, the most libertarian stances concerning the Olher,
Differance, el al., reveal as their secret truth the suppressivc bent ofall panicky
orthodoxy and a firm allegiance, not to Rea<;on, Justice, or Autonomy. or to art
as the product of human freedom which is the object of aesthetics. but to the
magical ring of a proper name.
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